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gidgegannup_ltr230716 [2016/08/02 09:24] – created Keith Woodleygidgegannup_ltr230716 [2020/11/11 12:56] (current) – external edit 127.0.0.1
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-Copy of letter received for general distribution by email 02/08/16:-+<font inherit/inherit;;inherit;;#FFFF00>Copy of letter received for general distribution by email 02/08/16:-</font>
  
 Gidgegannup Progress Association (Inc.)\\ Gidgegannup Progress Association (Inc.)\\
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 **Re.: Waroona Bush Fire Special Enquiry – Ferguson Report** **Re.: Waroona Bush Fire Special Enquiry – Ferguson Report**
  
-The Gidgegannup Progress Association, representing the Gidgegannup Community, has carefully\\ +The Gidgegannup Progress Association, representing the Gidgegannup Community, has carefully considered the recently released report "Reframing Rural Fire Management" - Report of the Special Enquiry into the January 2016 Waroona Fire. We strongly recommend adoption by the WA Government of all of the report's recommendations and opportunities for improvement.
-considered the recently released report "Reframing Rural Fire Management" - Report of the\\ +
-Special Enquiry into the January 2016 Waroona Fire. We strongly recommend adoption by the WA\\ +
-Government of all of the report's recommendations and opportunities for improvement.+
  
 The Gidgegannup community is located in a high bushfire risk area, characterised by low population densities (except in a few small areas such as the existing town site and subdivisions), extensive tracts of bushland and farming country, and often rugged terrain with difficult access. We are becoming increasingly concerned with the trend towards increasing scale of large intense bush fires in the South West of WA in the past 10 to 15 years, with a near exponential increase in housing and infrastructure losses, some loss of life, and environmental destruction. The Gidgegannup community is located in a high bushfire risk area, characterised by low population densities (except in a few small areas such as the existing town site and subdivisions), extensive tracts of bushland and farming country, and often rugged terrain with difficult access. We are becoming increasingly concerned with the trend towards increasing scale of large intense bush fires in the South West of WA in the past 10 to 15 years, with a near exponential increase in housing and infrastructure losses, some loss of life, and environmental destruction.
  
-Fortunately Gidgegannup has escaped the worst of these so far, this is in no small part to the efforts\\ +Fortunately Gidgegannup has escaped the worst of these so far, this is in no small part to the efforts of our dedicated Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades, other emergency services, and the community itself. However despite these best endeavours, impact of such scale, as has occurred in areas such as Waroona, Lower Hotham, O'Sullivan etc., is inevitable unless major change in the way bush fire risk is managed occurs.
-of our dedicated Volunteer Bush Fire Brigades, other emergency services, and the community itself.\\ +
-However despite these best endeavours, impact of such scale, as has occurred in areas such as\\ +
-Waroona, Lower Hotham, O'Sullivan etc., is inevitable unless major change in the way bush fire risk is managed occurs.+
  
-The Gidge community was fortunate in where the Red Hill fire started and ran in February 2011, that the Avon Valley/Walyunga fire of 2013 was pushed to the west, and that the\\ +The Gidge community was fortunate in where the Red Hill fire started and ran in February 2011, that the Avon Valley/Walyunga fire of 2013 was pushed to the west, and that the Parkerville/Stoneville/Mt Helena fire of January 2014 did not continue its run further north. We\\ 
-Parkerville/Stoneville/Mt Helena fire of January 2014 did not continue its run further north. We\\ +were also exposed to at least 18 fires caused by lightning at the same time as the January 2016 Waroona fire was at/near its worst. Fortunately a combination of prompt action by our local volunteers and by residents, combined with much more favourable weather conditions, prevented this turning into an inferno on the scale of the Waroona/Yarloop fire.
-were also exposed to at least 18 fires caused by lightning at the same time as the January 2016 Waroona fire was at/near its worst. Fortunately a combination of prompt action by our local\\ +
-volunteers and by residents, combined with much more favourable weather conditions, prevented\\ +
-this turning into an inferno on the scale of the Waroona/Yarloop fire.+
  
-We have also seen an increase in arson attacks in the area, over this last fire season at least 50, and\\ +We have also seen an increase in arson attacks in the area, over this last fire season at least 50, and up to 9 in one night. Fortunately none of these got to a significant size, partly largely due to prompt action by volunteers and residents, but also due to favourable weather at the time.
-up to 9 in one night. Fortunately none of these got to a significant size, partly largely due to prompt\\ +
-action by volunteers and residents, but also due to favourable weather at the time.+
  
-//**Bush Fire is inevitable, despite our best endeavours - we need to get better at dealing with the\\ +//**Bush Fire is inevitable, despite our best endeavours - we need to get better at dealing with the associated risk!** //
-associated risk!** //+
  
-We are particularly disturbed by what seems to have been a trend by all levels of Government in the\\ +We are particularly disturbed by what seems to have been a trend by all levels of Government in the past 15 years to place too much reliance on response to incidents, and not enough on mitigation. Despite the criticism levelled in their direction, and to their credit, Parks and Wildlife are the only state agency that actually does undertake significant hazard reduction.
-past 15 years to place too much reliance on response to incidents, and not enough on mitigation.\\ +
-Despite the criticism levelled in their direction, and to their credit, Parks and Wildlife are the only\\ +
-state agency that actually does undertake significant hazard reduction.+
  
-However a majority of State land not under Parks and Wildlife jurisdiction or covered by an MOU is not managed properly. The Crown not being bound by the Bush Fires Act can be seen as one of the factors behind this. Prior to the abolition of the Bush Fires Board at the end of the 90s and the\\ +However a majority of State land not under Parks and Wildlife jurisdiction or covered by an MOU is not managed properly. The Crown not being bound by the Bush Fires Act can be seen as one of the factors behind this. Prior to the abolition of the Bush Fires Board at the end of the 90s and the assumption of responsibility for its role (supposedly) by FESA this land was far better managed. The willingness to deal with, and capacity for mitigation, has largely disappeared from DFES, and the Ferguson Report refers (see page 98-99) to the view of the FES Commissioner that it is not DFES (or his) responsibility.
-assumption of responsibility for its role (supposedly) by FESA this land was far better managed. The willingness to deal with, and capacity for mitigation, has largely disappeared from DFES, and the Ferguson Report refers (see page 98-99) to the view of the FES Commissioner that it is not DFES (or his) responsibility.+
  
-Mitigation, especially hazard reduction burning is particularly effective in reducing bush fire risk.\\ +Mitigation, especially hazard reduction burning is particularly effective in reducing bush fire risk. Fire needs heat, oxygen and fuel. We cannot change the % of oxygen in the air, or the heat of the day. We cannot reduce the fuel on the day of the fire except in very tiny areas. The only factor we can influence is fuel, and this needs to be done well in advance as part of a robust and appropriate regime of fuel management.
-Fire needs heat, oxygen and fuel. We cannot change the % of oxygen in the air, or the heat of the\\ +
-day. We cannot reduce the fuel on the day of the fire except in very tiny areas. The only factor we\\ +
-can influence is fuel, and this needs to be done well in advance as part of a robust and appropriate\\ +
-regime of fuel management.+
  
 As was the case at State level while the Bush Fires Board was in place, City of Swan were much more proactive in implementing hazard reduction programmes, especially hazard reduction burning, up until the end of the 90s when changed arrangements and MOUs with FESA led to the disbandment of the City of Swan fire management team and replacement by a single Community Fire Manager. To the credit of City of Swan, and in response to very strong community and volunteer lobbying over a number of years, this team has started to rebuild. Much more work has been done recently in terms of firebreak construction and maintenance on city land, and the Bush Fire Risk Management Process is underway. As was the case at State level while the Bush Fires Board was in place, City of Swan were much more proactive in implementing hazard reduction programmes, especially hazard reduction burning, up until the end of the 90s when changed arrangements and MOUs with FESA led to the disbandment of the City of Swan fire management team and replacement by a single Community Fire Manager. To the credit of City of Swan, and in response to very strong community and volunteer lobbying over a number of years, this team has started to rebuild. Much more work has been done recently in terms of firebreak construction and maintenance on city land, and the Bush Fire Risk Management Process is underway.
  
-Regardless, we see continually increasing fuel loads in reserves and bush land road verges which\\ +Regardless, we see continually increasing fuel loads in reserves and bush land road verges which significantly increase the risks to the community. Non natural causes of ignition, including arson, from power line faults, and from cigarette butts etc are particularly predominant in these verges. There has been significant reluctance to deal adequately with this issue despite strong lobbying from the community, and from Bush Fire Volunteers and their leaders. As referred to in the Ferguson Report, the barriers to hazard reduction burning need to be lowered.
-significantly increase the risks to the community. Non natural causes of ignition, including arson,\\ +
-from power line faults, and from cigarette butts etc are particularly predominant in these verges.\\ +
-There has been significant reluctance to deal adequately with this issue despite strong lobbying from the community, and from Bush Fire Volunteers and their leaders. As referred to in the Ferguson Report, the barriers to hazard reduction burning need to be lowered.+
  
-Private bushland is also an area of concern. The level of experience and confidence of landowners in managing that risk has been significantly eroded in the past couple of decades due to changing population demographics associated with farming as a full or part time career being far less\\ +Private bushland is also an area of concern. The level of experience and confidence of landowners in managing that risk has been significantly eroded in the past couple of decades due to changing population demographics associated with farming as a full or part time career being far less common, and with the "tree change" effect. They also face the disincentive of what they see as the poor example of all levels of Government in managing that risk, in particular road verges and reserves, and barriers in terms of approvals. They also have quite legitimate concerns re environmental impacts which do need to be addressed. Landowners do engage brigades to assist in hazard reduction under City auspices, however volunteer time and weather windows are limited.\\
-common, and with the "tree change" effect. They also face the disincentive of what they see as the\\ +
-poor example of all levels of Government in managing that risk, in particular road verges and\\ +
-reserves, and barriers in terms of approvals. They also have quite legitimate concerns re\\ +
-environmental impacts which do need to be addressed. Landowners do engage brigades to assist in\\ +
-hazard reduction under City auspices, however volunteer time and weather windows are limited.\\+
 The Ferguson Report recommends that available National and State Funding be accessed to assist these landowners. The Ferguson Report recommends that available National and State Funding be accessed to assist these landowners.
  
-What is needed is empowerment of these landowners by "upskilling" them so they can safely\\ +What is needed is empowerment of these landowners by "upskilling" them so they can safely manage hazard reduction burning themselves. Yet even this looks like being made much more difficult due to changes proposed by DFES to the Bush Fires Act Sect 35 which will make a Brigade Member assisting with a privately managed burn not considered a "normal brigade activity". This could mean the current practice of some senior volunteers, especially Bush Fire Control Officers, of assisting landowners to develop a plan, and then being there on the day to assist them exposes them to legal repercussions.
-manage hazard reduction burning themselves. Yet even this looks like being made much more\\ +
-difficult due to changes proposed by DFES to the Bush Fires Act Sect 35 which will make a Brigade Member assisting with a privately managed burn not considered a "normal brigade activity". This could mean the current practice of some senior volunteers, especially Bush Fire Control Officers, of assisting landowners to develop a plan, and then being there on the day to assist them exposes them to legal repercussions.+
  
-Hazard management by private landowners needs to be strongly encouraged, and supported by all\\ +Hazard management by private landowners needs to be strongly encouraged, and supported by all levels of Government, not disincentivised!
-levels of Government, not disincentivised!+
  
 //**Prevention is the first of the priorities in risk management principles, and therefore bush fire\\ //**Prevention is the first of the priorities in risk management principles, and therefore bush fire\\
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 appropriately supported and encouraged, and unnecessary barriers to implementation removed.** // appropriately supported and encouraged, and unnecessary barriers to implementation removed.** //
  
-The organisation responsible for management of Bush Fire Risk and of our volunteers is a strong\\ +The organisation responsible for management of Bush Fire Risk and of our volunteers is a strong area of concern. Gidgegannup has 2 strong bush fire brigades, part of a network of over 500 BFBs across WA managed by Local Government and which make up over 70% of WA's Emergency services personnel. We have a strong belief that these brigades and volunteers should be appropriately managed, and by Bush Fire Managers with a strong empathy with volunteers and "extensive and credible" experience with bush fire.
-area of concern. Gidgegannup has 2 strong bush fire brigades, part of a network of over 500 BFBs\\ +
-across WA managed by Local Government and which make up over 70% of WA's Emergency services personnel. We have a strong belief that these brigades and volunteers should be appropriately managed, and by Bush Fire Managers with a strong empathy with volunteers and "extensive and credible" experience with bush fire.+
  
-The //**Parkerville/Stoneville/Mt Helena 2014 Review**// opportunity for improvement 3.4.1 refers to\\ +The //**Parkerville/Stoneville/Mt Helena 2014 Review**// opportunity for improvement 3.4.1 refers to this. Such experience MUST include extensive hazard mitigation experience, including of hazard reduction burning. The Ferguson Report also refers to the institutional and cultural barriers within DFES which have caused significant issues in dealing with bush fire risk and with volunteers, and with promotion within the system for anyone from a predominantly bush fire background.
-this. Such experience MUST include extensive hazard mitigation experience, including of hazard\\ +
-reduction burning. The Ferguson Report also refers to the institutional and cultural barriers within\\ +
-DFES which have caused significant issues in dealing with bush fire risk and with volunteers, and with promotion within the system for anyone from a predominantly bush fire background.+
  
-Volunteers have also frequently expressed concerns to us about the level of expertise in bush fire in\\ +Volunteers have also frequently expressed concerns to us about the level of expertise in bush fire in some (but by no means all) of the DFES managers with whom they deal operationally, and in the attitude of some DFES managers. They are also concerned with non recognition of competencies by career FRS, especially when volunteer sector commanders with appropriate training, local knowledge and experience are not recognised as such by some career FRS staff who refuse to take directions from them. There have been frequent reports of barriers within DFES for anyone from a predominantly bush fire back ground.
-some (but by no means all) of the DFES managers with whom they deal operationally, and in the\\ +
-attitude of some DFES managers. They are also concerned with non recognition of competencies by\\ +
-career FRS, especially when volunteer sector commanders with appropriate training, local\\ +
-knowledge and experience are not recognised as such by some career FRS staff who refuse to take\\ +
-directions from them. There have been frequent reports of barriers within DFES for anyone from a\\ +
-predominantly bush fire back ground.+
  
-Currently Bush Fire Brigades are not managed by DFES but by Local Government, and maintain\\ +Currently Bush Fire Brigades are not managed by DFES but by Local Government, and maintain strong community links. There are flaws with this system, but being taken over by DFES will not improve this situation, but make it worse, for the reasons above, as described in the Ferguson Report, and as frequently expressed by volunteers and experienced bush fire management practitioners.
-strong community links. There are flaws with this system, but being taken over by DFES will not\\ +
-improve this situation, but make it worse, for the reasons above, as described in the Ferguson\\ +
-Report, and as frequently expressed by volunteers and experienced bush fire management\\ +
-practitioners.+
  
 Having an independent Rural Fire Service managed by bush fire risk specialists, with responsibilities and resourcing for mitigation, and with strong links to Local Government and communities is by far the preferred model and will assist in making communities, including Gidgegannup, much more resilient rather than reliant. Having an independent Rural Fire Service managed by bush fire risk specialists, with responsibilities and resourcing for mitigation, and with strong links to Local Government and communities is by far the preferred model and will assist in making communities, including Gidgegannup, much more resilient rather than reliant.
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 The management of the Emergency Services Levy is of community concern. All ratepayers contribute to this. When instituted it was supposed to be to provide front line services. However this had suffered "mission creep". Increasingly in recent years we are seeing it used to fund an increasingly top heavy bureaucracy within DFES, and to cover an ever reducing state govt budget allocation. There are also concerns with the prime beneficiary i.e. DFES being also the body that is responsible for the fund management. The Keelty report //**A Shared Responsibility - The Report of the Perth Hills Bush Fire February 2011 Review**//, recommended that this anomaly be corrected, but (unsurprisingly) FESA/DFES objected and the state govt did not bring about the change. The management of the Emergency Services Levy is of community concern. All ratepayers contribute to this. When instituted it was supposed to be to provide front line services. However this had suffered "mission creep". Increasingly in recent years we are seeing it used to fund an increasingly top heavy bureaucracy within DFES, and to cover an ever reducing state govt budget allocation. There are also concerns with the prime beneficiary i.e. DFES being also the body that is responsible for the fund management. The Keelty report //**A Shared Responsibility - The Report of the Perth Hills Bush Fire February 2011 Review**//, recommended that this anomaly be corrected, but (unsurprisingly) FESA/DFES objected and the state govt did not bring about the change.
  
-//**We support removal of the management of the Emergency Services Levy from DFES to an\\ +//**We support removal of the management of the Emergency Services Levy from DFES to an independent agency** //
-independent agency** //+
  
-There have been a number of reports and enquiries in recent years, most notably the Keelty Report\\ +There have been a number of reports and enquiries in recent years, most notably the Keelty Report //**A Shared Responsibility - The Report of the Perth Hills Bush Fire February 2011 Review,**//. These addressed some of the issues. There have been other enquiries with Margaret River, Black Cat Creek, Lower Hotham, O'Sullivan to name just a few. However as detailed in the Ferguson report, many of the recommendations have not been fully implemented, and the resultant actions have not adequately addressed the failings of the current management arrangements. In a number of cases we have concerns that the enquiries themselves (and their outcomes) were being managed by the agencies which themselves were subject to being investigated.
-//**A Shared Responsibility - The Report of the Perth Hills Bush Fire February 2011 Review,**//. These\\ +
-addressed some of the issues. There have been other enquiries with Margaret River, Black Cat Creek, Lower Hotham, O'Sullivan to name just a few. However as detailed in the Ferguson report, many of the recommendations have not been fully implemented, and the resultant actions have not\\ +
-adequately addressed the failings of the current management arrangements. In a number of cases\\ +
-we have concerns that the enquiries themselves (and their outcomes) were being managed by the\\ +
-agencies which themselves were subject to being investigated.+
  
-We commend the WA Government, through Department of Premier and Cabinet, in commissioning\\ +We commend the WA Government, through Department of Premier and Cabinet, in commissioning the enquiry into the Waroona Bush Fires, leading to the recently released report //**"Reframing Rural Fire Management" - Report of the Special Enquiry into the January 2016 Waroona Fire**//. This report does address the fundamental issues adequately, and in a way which has not been seriously done since the //**1961 Royal Commission into the Bush Fires of Dec 1960, and Jan, Feb and Mar 1961**//. It should be noted that the follow up from that Royal Commission resulted in robust and adequate bush fire management on the SW of the state for 40 years without the massive scale of housing and infrastructure loss which has occurred in recent years. It should not be seen as just a coincidence that the scale and consequences of bush fires in recent years seems to have been since the Bush Fires Board was abolished, and the formation of FESA and then DFES.
-the enquiry into the Waroona Bush Fires, leading to the recently released report //**"Reframing Rural\\ +
-Fire Management" - Report of the Special Enquiry into the January 2016 Waroona Fire**//. This report does address the fundamental issues adequately, and in a way which has not been seriously done since the //**1961 Royal Commission into the Bush Fires of Dec 1960, and Jan, Feb and Mar 1961**//. It should be noted that the follow up from that Royal Commission resulted in robust and adequate bush fire management on the SW of the state for 40 years without the massive scale of housing and infrastructure loss which has occurred in recent years. It should not be seen as just a coincidence that the scale and consequences of bush fires in recent years seems to have been since the Bush Fires Board was abolished, and the formation of FESA and then DFES.+
  
 //**Significant change is required** // //**Significant change is required** //
  
-We therefore strongly urge that the WA Government adopt all of the recommendations and\\ +We therefore strongly urge that the WA Government adopt all of the recommendations and opportunities for improvement arising from //**"Reframing Rural Fire Management" - Report of the Special Enquiry into the January 2016 Waroona Fire.** //
-opportunities for improvement arising from //**"Reframing Rural Fire Management" - Report of the\\ +
-Special Enquiry into the January 2016 Waroona Fire.** //+
  
 In particular we strongly support In particular we strongly support
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 • Any measures which contribute to Community resilience • Any measures which contribute to Community resilience
  
-The Gidgegannup Progress Association respectfully insists that for the sake of the protection of not\\ +The Gidgegannup Progress Association respectfully insists that for the sake of the protection of not only our local community, but of the whole state, that the recommendations in this report be fully implemented, and in a timely manner.
-only our local community, but of the whole state, that the recommendations in this report be fully\\ +
-implemented, and in a timely manner.+
  
 Yours faithfully, Yours faithfully,